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Abstract
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations
before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of
utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order to provide additional incentives
for each other to play designated strategies. The enforcement of such offers is conditional
on the recipients playing the specified strategies and they effect transformations of the
payoff matrix of the game by accordingly transferring payoffs between players. Players
can exchange series of such offers in a preplay negotiation game in an extensive form.
We introduce and analyze solution concepts for normal form games with such preplay
offers under various assumptions for the preplay negotiation phase and obtain results for
existence of efficient negotiation strategies of the players.
1 Introduction
It is well known that some normal form games have no pure strategy Nash equilibria, while
others, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, have rather unsatisfactory – e.g., strongly Pareto domi-
nated – ones. These inefficiencies are often attributed to the lack of communication between
the players and the impossibility for them to agree on a mutually beneficial joint course of
action, before the actual play of the game. Indeed, undesirable outcomes could often be
avoided if players were able to communicate and make binding agreements on the strategy
to play before the game starts, by signing contracts. However, even if players could freely
communicate before the game, enforcing of such contracts is often not possible in practice
and, furthermore, it would change the nature of the game from non-cooperative to essentially
cooperative.
Here we consider a weaker and generally more realistic assumption, viz.:
Before the actual game is played any player, say A, can make a binding offer
to any other player, say B, to pay him1, after the game is played, an explicitly
declared amount of utility δ if B plays a strategy s specified in the offer by A.
1We refer to player A as a female, while to B as a male. This choice is not for the sake of political correctness
but to make it easier to distinguish the players from the context.
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Building up upon this basic, unconditional, form of offer, we also consider a more general
setting, where players, without acting as a coalition, can propose a game transformation to
their fellow players, by making an offer under the condition of receiving another offer in return,
proposal that can, in turn, be accepted or rejected. This newly obtained game transformation
can be further modified, with proposals made by other players, until an agreement is reached.
When endowing players with the possibility of playing such extra pre-play moves, a whole
bargaining phase emerges before a normal form game is actually played. In other words, we
can think of the normal form game that is eventually played as an outcome of another game,
played beforehand, in which players engage in exchanging offers on strategies of other players
until an agreement is reached on the game to play.
Introducing an extensive-form bargaining structure preceding the play of a normal form
game is relevant and important for the analysis of a wide spectrum of economic, social and
political situations, such as:
• corruption schemes involving bribes in exchange of illegal favors;
• collusions between two or more parties in an economic activity, by exchanging ‘behind
the curtain’ agreements for mutual incentives.
• kickback schemes and other quasi-legal incentives,
• political, labour-related or business negotiations and compromises between non-cooperative
parties,
• compensations, concessions, out-of-court settlements of legal cases, etc.
For further details and discussions of these kinds of scenarios see for instance in [Gut78,
Gut87, Sch60, Seg99].
We note that agreements in such economic and political negotiations are usually reached
in dynamic bargaining processes made of offers and counteroffers, rather than a one-shot
simultaneous proposal ending the talks.
The literature in economic theory abounds with examples of parties entering negotiations
to overcome inefficient resource allocation, as well as schemes of side payments, compensatory
mechanisms, etc., which we review in detail in Section 7. Here we only mention some more
recent studies of pre-play contracting in games that consider one-shot simultaneous, in [JW05],
[EP11], or two-step, in [Yam05], offers preceding the actual game play and conditional on
the entire strategy profile (see discussion in Section 7). Somewhat surprisingly, however, a
systematic study of the extensive-form negotiation process preceding the actual game play
seems still to be missing in the literature. With this paper we initiate such systematic study
purporting to fill this gap, by formalizing and studying the negotiation process preceding
the actual game play as a bargaining among the players on the game to play, thus drawing
connections with modern bargaining theory, in particular, Rubinstein’s model of bargaining
games [OR90, OR94]. The paper is intended as a research ‘manifesto’ in which we introduce
and discuss conceptually our framework and outline a long term research agenda on it. In
particular, we discuss our framework in more detail in Section 2, illustrate and discuss preplay
offers and offer-induced game transformations in Section 3 and introduce normal form games
with preplay negotiations phase in Section 4. Then we analyze the case of 2-player normal
form games with preplay offers with unconditional offers under various assumptions for the
preplay negotiation phase in Section 5 and then we analyze the case with conditional offers
in Section 6, where we obtain results for existence of efficient negotiation strategies of both
players, significantly extending our work in [GT13]. We end the paper with discussion of
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related work in Section 7 and concluding remarks and directions for further study in Section
8.
2 Non-cooperative games with preplay offers:
the conceptual framework
In this section we provide a more detailed description of preplay offers, discuss some moti-
vating examples, and lay down several extra conditions that play a role in determining the
outcome of the negotiation phase.
2.1 Preplay offers in more detail
We assume that any preplay offer by A to B is binding for A, conditional on B playing
the strategy s specified by A2. However, such offer does not create any obligation for B
and therefore it does not transform the game into a cooperative one, for B is still at liberty
to choose his strategy when the game is actually played. In particular, after her offer A
does not know before the game is played whether B will play the desired by A strategy s,
and will thus make use of the offer, or not. Furthermore, several such offers can be made,
possibly by different players, so the possible rational behaviours of the payers game maintain,
in principle, all their complexity. The key observation applying to this assumption, is that
after any binding preplay offer is made, the game remains a standard non-cooperative normal
form game, only the payoff matrix changes according to the offer.
2.2 Motivating examples
First, we introduce the following notation: A
δ/σB−−−→ B denotes an offer made by player A to
pay an amount δ to player B after the play of the game if player B plays strategy σB.
Prisoners’ Dilemma 1 Consider a standard version of the Prisoner’ s Dilemma (PD) game
in Figure 1. The only Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game is (D,D), yielding a payoff of (1, 1).
C D
C 4, 4 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma 1
Now, suppose Row
2/C−−→ Column, that is, player Row makes to the player Column a binding
offer to pay her 2 units of utility (hereafter, utils) after the game if Column plays C. That
offer transforms the game by transferring 2 utils from the payoff of Row to the payoff of
Column in every entry of the column where Column plays C, as pictured in Figure 2.
In this game player Row still has the incentive3 to play D, which strictly dominates C for
2We will not discuss here the mechanism securing the payments of the preplay offers after the play if the
conditions are met. That can be done by a legal contract, or by using a trusted third party, etc.
3Intuitively, having the incentive to play a strategy should be understood as realizing that that strategy
is not dominated. Later on we will provide a formal and abstract notion of equilibrium, which will rule out
dominated strategies to be part of the solution of a game.
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C D
C 2, 6 0, 5
D 3, 2 1, 1
Figure 2: An offer to cooperate by player Row.
him, but the dominant strategy for Column now is C, and thus the only Nash equilibrium is
(D,C) with payoff (3, 2) – strictly dominating the original payoff (1, 1).
Thus, even though player Row will still defect, the offer he has made to player Column
makes it strictly better for Column to cooperate.
Of course, Column can now realize that if player Row is to cooperate, then Column would
be even better off, but for that an extra incentive for Row is needed. That incentive can be
created by an offer Column
2/C−−→ Row , that is, if Column, too, makes an offer to Row to pay
him 2 utils after the game, if player Row cooperates. Then the game transforms, as in Figure
3.
C D
C 4, 4 2, 3
D 3, 2 1, 1
Figure 3: A second offer, by player Column.
In this game, the only Nash equilibrium is (C,C) with payoff (4, 4), which is also Pareto
optimal. Note that this is the same payoff for (C,C) as in the original PD game, but now
both players have created incentives for their opponents to cooperate, and have thus escaped
from the trap of the original inefficient Nash equilibrium (D,D).
Remark 1 Clearly, preplay offers can only work in case when at least part of the received
payoff can actually be transferred from a player to another. They obviously cannot apply to
scenarios such as the original PD, where one prisoner cannot offer to the other to stay in
prison for him, even if they could communicate before the play.
Prisoners’ Dilemma 2 Consider another version of the Prisoner’ s Dilemma game in
Figure 4. The only Nash Equilibrium in this game is (DRow, DCol), yielding the Pareto
CCol DCol
CRow 4, 4 0, 5
DRow 5, 0 3, 3
Figure 4: Prisoner’s Dilemma 2
dominated payoff of (3, 3). Now, note that none of the players can make a feasible first offer
to improve the outcome. Indeed, in order to provide a sufficient incentive for Column to play
CCol, Row would have to offer him more than 3, which is unfeasible for Row because it would
put him in a disadvantaged position. Likewise for Column.
Thus, by consecutive exchange of unilateral preplay offers rational players cannot realize
the opportunity to play the Pareto optimal outcome (CRow, CCol).
This problem can be avoided if we allow conditional offers as follows: Row can make an
offer Row
3/CCol−−−−→ Column, but now, conditional on Column making to Row the matching
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counter-offer Column
3/CRow−−−−−→ Row , which we hereafter denote as Row 3/CCol | 3/CRow−−−−−−−−−−−→ Row .
The idea is that, unlike the so far considered unconditional offers, Row ’s conditional offer is
only confirmed and enforced if Row does make the required counter-offer, else it is cancelled
and nullified before the play of the game.
We will introduce formally and discuss conditional offers in detail further.
2.3 Additional optional assumptions
There are several important additional assumptions that, depending on the particular scenar-
ios under investigation may, or may not, be realistically made. We therefore do not commit
to any of them, but we acknowledge that each of them can make a significant difference in the
behaviour and abilities of players to steer the game in the best possible direction for them.
So, we consider the possible options for each of them separately and study the consequences
under the various combinations of assumptions.
Revocability of offers. Once made, offers may, or may not, be withdrawn during the ne-
gotiations phase. Both cases are reasonable and realistic, and we consider each of them
separately.
Value of time. Time, measured discretely as the number of explicitly defined steps/rounds
of the negotiations, may or may not have value, i.e. players may, or may not, strictly
prefer a reward in the present to the same reward in the future. Moreover, time may
have the same value for all players, or may be more, or less, valuable for each of them
depending on their patience.
• In the case when time is of no value, players can keep making and withdrawing
offers (if allowed to do so) at no extra cost. Intuitively the effect should be the
same as if withdrawn offers were never made.
• In the case when time is of value, making unacceptable or suboptimal offers or
withdrawing offers that were made earlier should intuitively lead to inefficient
negotiation and, consequently, strategies involving such offers or withdrawing offers
would not be subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. This intuition is confirmed
by our technical results.
The order of making offers. The order in which offers are made by the different players
can be essential, especially in case of irrevocable offers. In such cases we assume that
the order in which players can make offers is set by a separate, exogenous protocol
which is an added component of the preplay negotiations game; for instance, it can be
strictly alternating or random. Alternatively, the offers may be required to be made
simultaneously by all players, as in [JW05] and [EP11] but we do not consider that
option.
Rejection of offers. Once made, offers may, or may not, be officially rejected before the
play. A rejection by a player B of an offer made to her by a player A has the same
practical effect as a withdrawal of the offer by A, but the choice to withdraw or not is
now in the hands of B. Both options can be reasonable in different scenarios.
Conditionality of offers. As discussed earlier, offers may be unconditional, i.e., not subject
to acceptance or rejection by the player to whom the offer is made, or conditional upon
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an expected (suggested or demanded) counter-offer by the player to whom the offer was
made. Acceptance of a conditional offer means both acceptance of the offer and making
the expected counter-offer. We emphasize that after acceptance, a conditional offer
does not constitute a contract between the players turning the game into a cooperative
one, but only a pair of unilateral offers, each binding only its proposer. It therefore
transforms the current game into another non-cooperative game. Rejection/withdrawal
of a conditional offer means cancellation of both of the unconditional offers of which
it consists. The option of rejection/withdrawal of conditional offers can be reasonably
assumed under some circumstances (e.g. possibility for extended communication and
for a low-cost negotiations), but not in others. We will consider both cases separately.
3 Preplay offers and induced game transformations
In this section we describe the game transformations induced by preplay offers in a general
and more technical fashion.
3.1 Transformations of normal form games by preplay offers
B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j , b1j · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j , b2j · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij , bij · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Figure 5: A general 2-player game
Here we formally define the notion of transformation induced by a preplay offers. For
technical convenience we consider general 2-player game with a payoff matrix given in Figure
5; the case of N-player games is a straightforward generalization.
Suppose player A makes a preplay offer to player B to pay her additional utility4 α ≥ 0 if
B plays Bj . Recall that we denote such offer by A
α/Bj−−−→ B. It transforms the payoff matrix
of the game as indicated in Figure 6.
B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j − α, b1j + α · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j − α, b2j + α · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij − α, bij + α · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Figure 6: A general 2-player game with an offer.
We will call such transformation of a payoff matrix a primitive offer-induced trans-
formation, or a POI-transformation, for short.
4The reason we allow vacuous offers with α = 0 is not only to have an identity transformation at hand, but
also because such offers can be used by players as signaling, to enable coordination.
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Several preplay offers can be made by each players. Clearly, the transformation of
a payoff matrix induced by several preplay offers can be obtained by applying the POI-
transformations corresponding to each of the offers consecutively, in any order. We will call
such transformations offer-induced transformations, or OI-transformations, for short.
Thus, every OI-transformation corresponds to a set of preplay offers, respectively a set of
POI-transformations. Note that the set generating a given OI-transformation need not be
unique, e.g., A can make two independent offers A
α1/Bj−−−−→ B and A α2/Bj−−−−→ B equivalent to
the single offer A
α1+α2/Bj−−−−−−−→ B.
The general mathematical theory of OI-transformations is studied in more detail in [Gor12].
Here we only mention some observations about the game-theoretic effects of OI-transformations,
which will be useful later on.
1. An OI-transformation does not change the sum of the payoffs of all players in any
outcome, only redistributes it. In particular, OI-transformations preserve the class of
zero-sum games.
2. An OI-transformation induced by a preplay offer by player A does not change the
preferences of A regarding her own strategies. In particular, (weak or strict) dominance
between strategies of player A is invariant under OI-transformations induced by preplay
offers of A, i.e.: a strategy Ai dominates (weakly, resp. strongly) a strategy Aj before
a transformation induced by a preplay offer made by A if and only if Ai dominates
(weakly, resp. strongly) Aj after the transformation.
3. The players can collude to make any designated outcome, with any redistribution of its
payoffs, a dominant strategy equilibrium, by exchanging sufficiently high offers to make
the strategies generating that outcome with that redistribution of the payoffs, strictly
dominant.
Thus, preplay offers can transform the game matrix radically. However, we note that not
every matrix transformation that preserves the sums of the payoffs in every outcome can be
induced by preplay offers. In particular, this is the case if the transformed matrix differs
from the original one in only one payoff. For general necessary and sufficient condition for a
normal form game to be obtained from another by preplay offers see [Gor12].
A central question arising is what should be regarded as a solution of a strategic game
allowing binding preplay offers. The possible answers to that question crucially depend on
the additional assumptions discussed earlier and on the procedure of ’preplay negotiations’;
these will be discussed further.
3.2 Extending preplay offers and OI-transformations
3.2.1 Conditional offers
Unconditional offers always decrease the proponent’s payoff at some outcomes, and hence
making an unconditional offer comes with a cost. As in the Prisoners’ Dilemma 2 Example
2.2, this can be a hindrance for making mutually beneficial offers and we will discuss this
problem in more details in Section 5.2. Furthermore, often in real life situations players who
make such preplay offers expect some form of reciprocity from their fellow players and make
their offers conditional on an expected ‘return of favour’.
7
For these reasons, we now extend the preplay offers framework to enable players to sug-
gest a transformation of the starting game, by making a conditional offer to an opponent
for payment subject to playing a certain strategy, in exchange for a similar ‘counter-offer’
from that opponent. More precisely, every conditional offer, denoted as A
α/σB | β/ρA−−−−−−−−→ B
is associated with a suggested transformation of the starting game G into a game G(X)
where X = {A α/σB−−−→ B,B β/ρA−−−→ A}.
Two responses of the recipient of a conditional offer A
α/σB | β/ρA−−−−−−−−→ B are possible: it can
be accepted or rejected by the player receiving it. If rejected, the offer is immediately cancelled
and does not commit any of the players to any payment, and therefore it does not induce any
transformation of the game matrix. If accepted, the actual transformation induced by the
offer is the suggested transformation defined above. Two important observations:
• an unconditional offer has the same effect as an accepted conditional offer with a trivial
counter-offer where β = 0.
• a conditional offer can be seen as the proposal of two separate unconditional offers that
can only be enforced together.
Conditional offers can be made to different players. Multiple conditional offers can be
made to the same player, contingent upon same or different strategies of the recipient and
the proposer, too.
3.2.2 Withdrawals of offers and transformations induced by them
Withdrawal of an offer, i.e. a ’change of mind’ by the player who makes the offer, can be
simulated in a sense by matching the amount α offered by A contingent on a given strategy
σB of B by offers from A to B for the same amount α, contingent on every other strategy
of B. However, his simulated offer withdrawal is costly for A and, while the preferences on
all outcomes remain the same for both players, the game is no longer the same. A proper
withdrawal ofA’s offer can only be achieved ifA extends his offer to cover all possible strategies
of B and B offers in return to pay back the amount α to A unconditionally, that is, makes
offers of amount α to A, contingent on all strategies of A.
If a player A withdraws an unconditional offer A
α/σ−−→ B made earlier by her, the trans-
formation G(XA) of the game G induced by that offer must be reverted. The withdrawal of
a transformation G(XA) is again a transformation, induced by the (fictitious) negative offer
A
−α/σ−−−−→ B. Likewise, the transformation associated with withdrawal of an earlier made and
accepted conditional offer A
α/σ|β/ρ−−−−−→ B consists of the reversal transformations of the two
constituent unconditional offers.
A withdrawal can thus be seen as a sort of unconditional reversal of payments that have
already been enforced in a previous accepted offer. Thereby the possibility of performing a
withdrawal strictly depends on the previous history of the negotiation and this feature will
be of fundamental importance when treating preplay negotiations as full-fledged extensive
games.
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4 Normal form games with preplay negotiations phase
In this section we first give some technical preliminaries and then introduce normal form
games with preplay negotiations phase, first informally and then we formally define preplay
negotiations games and discuss some features of them and the concept of efficiency of nego-
tiation strategies.
4.1 Preliminaries: solution concepts and values of normal form games
We will be using i, j, . . . for variables ranging over players, while A,B, . . . will denote individual
players.
4.1.1 Normal form games
Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , u) be a normal form game (hereafter abbreviated as NFG), where
N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players, {Σi}i∈N a family of strategies for each player and
u : N×∏i∈N Σi → R is a payoff function assigning to each player a utility for each strategy
profile. The game is played by each player i choosing a strategy from Σi. The resulting
strategy profile σ is the outcome of the play and ui(σ) = u(i, σ) is the associated payoff for
i. An outcome of a play of the game G is called maximal if it is a Pareto optimal outcome
with the highest sum of the payoffs of all players.
4.1.2 Solution concepts and solutions of normal form games
Let GN be the set of all normal form games for a set of players N . By solution concept for
GN we mean a map S that associates with each G ∈ GN a non-empty set S(G) of outcomes
of G, called the S-solution of the game. At times we will talk about players’ strategies that
are consistent with some solution concept. For a player i, we denote Si to be the restriction
of the mapping S to i returning, instead of full outcomes, only strategies of player i consistent
with S in the sense that Si(G) = {σi ∈ Σi | σ ∈ S(G)}. Slightly abusing notation we will
also consider mappings of the form S−i to indicate the mapping S(G) restricted to player
i’s opponents. Solution concepts formalize the concepts of rationality of the players in the
strategic games. A S-solution of a strategic game G basically tells us what outcomes of the
game the players could, or should, select in an actual play of that game, if they adopt the
solution concept S.
In this work we do not commit to a specific solution concept for the normal form games
but we assume that the one adopted by the players satisfies the necessary condition that every
outcome in any solution prescribed by that solution concept must survive iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. We will call such solution concepts acceptable. This condition
reflects the assumption that players would never play strategies that are dominated, and
that this exclusion is a common knowledge amongst them and can be used in their strategic
reasoning. Thus, the weakest acceptable solution concept is the one that returns all outcomes
surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Games for which the solution concept S returns a single outcome will be called S-solved.
For instance, every game with a strongly dominating strategy profile is S-solved for any
acceptable solution concept S. Games for which S returns only maximal outcomes will be
called optimally S-solvable. If for every player all these maximal outcomes provide the
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same payoffs, we call the game perfectly S-solvable. Games that areS-solved and perfectly
S-solvable (i.e., S returns one maximal outcome) will be called S-perfectly solved.
The ultimate objective of a preplay negotiation is to transform the starting NFG into a
perfectly S-solvable one. Ideally, it should be a S-perfectly solved one, but this is not always
possible: cf. any symmetric Coordination game.
4.1.3 Players’ expected values of a game
It is necessary for the preplay negotiation phase that will be introduced later for each player
to have an expected value of any NFG that can be played. Naturally, that expected
value would depend not only on the game but also on the adopted solution concept and on
the player’s level of risk tolerance. A risk-averse player would assign as expected value the
minimum of his payoffs over all outcomes in the respective solution, while a risk-neutral player
could take the probabilistic expected value of these payoffs, etc. Note that the expected value
of any S-solved game for any player i naturally should equal the payoff for i from the only
outcome in the solution.
For sake of definiteness, unless otherwise specified further, we adopt here the conservative,
risk-averse approach and will define for every acceptable solution concept S, game G and a
player i, the expected value of G for i relative to the solution concept S to be:
vSi (G) = max
σi∈Si(G)
min
σ−i∈S−i(G)
ui(σ)
4.2 Normal form games with preplay negotiations phase informally
Our setting for normal form games with preplay offers begins with a given ‘starting’ normal
form game G and consists of two phases:
• A preplay negotiation phase, where players negotiate on how to transform the game G
by making unconditional offers, accepting or rejecting conditional offers they receive,
and possibly withdrawing old ones. This phase constitutes an extensive form game,
which we call a preplay negotiation game (PNG).
• An actual play phase where, after having agreed on some OI-transformation X in the
previous phase, the players play the resulting game G(X).
Players engage in pre-play negotiations with the purpose of reaching a best for them
possible agreement based on OI transformation of the original game G. Major questions that
we set out to study are:
• What constitutes an optimal/rational/efficient negotiation strategy and what are the
expected outcome(s) when players follow such strategies?
• In particular, when can players agree upon Pareto optimal outcomes in their preplay
negotiations if playing rationally?
• What can, or should, players agree upon in the preplay negotiations phase when the
original game has several Pareto optimal outcomes?
Further we introduce, first informally and then fully formally, the setup of PNGs as
extensive-form bargaining games, including the concepts of moves and histories, the order of
moves, the possibility of players come to a disagreement, and finally a notion of solution for
these games.
10
4.3 Moves, histories and preplay negotiations games
Depending on some of the optional assumptions, the players can have several possible moves in
the preplay negotiations phase. Let us consider the most general case, where both conditional
offers and withdrawals of offers are allowed. Then the moves available to the player whose
turn is to play depend on whether or not he has received any conditional offers since his
previous move. If so, we say that the player has pending conditional offers. The possible
moves of the player in turn are as follows.
1. If the player has no pending conditional offers, he can:
(a) Make an offer (conditional or not).
(b) Pass.
(c) (Optional) Withdraw an offer he has made at a previous move.
(d) (Optional) Opt out (see Section 4.5).
2. If the player has pending conditional offers, for each of them he can:
(a) Accept the pending offer by making the requested counter-offer to the player who
has made the conditional offer, and then make an offer of his/her own or pass or
opt out (when available).
(b) Reject the pending offer, and then make an offer of his/her own or pass or opt out
(when available).
If all players have passed at their last move, or any player has opted out, the preplay
negotiations game is over.
We say that an offer of the game is passing if its acceptance by the opponents is followed
by a pass of the proponent. In other words, the one making the offer would be happy to end the
game with the suggested transformation. Likewise, an acceptance is passing if, once declared,
it is followed by a pass move of the same player. In other words, with a passing acceptance
a player declares agreement to terminate the game with the proposed transformation. When
opting out is not allowed, passing moves (i.e. offers or acceptances that are passing), are
the only way for players to terminate the game in agreement and the only way to effectively
deviate from undesired outcomes.
We now define the notion of a history in the preplay negotiations phase as a finite or
infinite sequence of admissible moves by the players who take their turns according to an
externally set protocol (see further). Every finite history in such a game is associated with
the current NFG: the result of the OI-transformation of the starting game by all offers that
are so far made, accepted (if conditional) and currently not withdrawn. The current NFG of
the empty history is the input NFG of the preplay negotiations game.
A play of a preplay negotiations game is any finite history at the end of which the preplay
negotiations game is over, or any infinite history.
In order to eventually define realistic solution concepts for preplay negotiations games we
need to endow every history in such games with value for every player. Intuitively, the value
of a history is the value for the player of the current NFG associated with that history in the
case of non-valuable time, and the same value accordingly discounted in the case of valuable
time.
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Now, a preplay negotiation game (PNG) can be defined generically as a turn-based,
possibly infinite, extensive form game that starts with an input NFG G and either ends with
a transformed game G′ or goes on forever, which we discuss further. The outcome of a play
of the PNG is the resulting transformed game G′ in the former case and ’Disagreement’
(briefly D) in the latter case.
4.4 Preplay negotiation games formally
Here we provide a formal definition for the general N-player case of preplay negotiation games.
Definition 2 (Preplay negotiation game) A preplay negotiation game is a tuple E =
(N,G,S,A,H, turn, {Σi}i∈N,g, out,u), where:
• N is the set of players.
• G is the starting normal form game.
• S is an acceptable solution concept for normal form games.
• A is a set of actions, or moves of types as discussed earlier.
• H is a non-empty set of finite or infinite sequences of actions, called histories, that
includes the empty sequence  and is prefix-closed, meaning that every prefix of a history
in H belongs to H, and limit-closed, meaning that the infinite union of a chain by
extension of finite histories in H belongs to H, too.
A history h ∈ H is f
¯
terminal in H if it is infinite or there is no history in H extending
it. The set of terminal histories in H is denoted by Ht and the set of finite histories in
H by Hf .
For h, h′ ∈ Hf and o ∈ A we denote by h; o the extension of h with the action o and by
h;h′ the concatenation of h with h′. XX
• turn : H \ Ht → N is the turn function, assigning the players who are to move at
non-terminal histories. We denote Hi := turn−1(i) for each i ∈ N the set of histories
where it is i’s turn to play.
Here we assume that the turned function is exogenously defined, e.g. in some fixed cyclic
order or depending on the last move made.
• Σi, for each i ∈ N , is a non-empty set of strategies σi : Hi → A that assigns an action
for i to any non-terminal history in Hi.
• g : H → GN is a function associating to each finite history the currently accepted
NFG, defined below.
• out : ∏i∈N Σi → Ht is an outcome play function, assigning to each strategy profile
σ the terminal history out(σ) generated by σ.
Respectively, the outcome NFG of σ is g(out(σ)).
• u : N → (Ht → R) is the utility function of the PNG, associating to each player
the payoff function ui such that ui(z) = v
S
i(g(z)) for every finite z ∈ Ht. Further, for
z, z′ ∈ Ht, with z finite and z′ infinite, we require that ui(z) ≥ ui(z′) for all players i,
and uj(z) > uj(z
′) for some j, i.e., no disagreement is better for all players than any
agreement.
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Now we define the function g. Its intended meaning is that g(h) would be the outcome
of the PNG if the game ended at h. Its precise definition depends on the repertoire of moves
that are allowed in the PNG, as follows:
• g() is the starting normal form game G.
• If h = h′; o, where the last move o is an unconditional offer, then g(h) = g(h′)(o), i.e.,
the transformation of g(h′) by the offer o.
• If h = h′; a, where the last move a is an acceptance of a conditional offer o, then
g(h) = g(h′)(o).
• If h = h′; o;h′′;w, where w is a withdrawal of the offer o then g(h) = g(h′;h′′), i.e. the
transformation by the withdrawn offer is reverted.
• In all other cases of actions a, g(h; a) = g(h).
Solution of PNG. By solution of a PNG we mean the set of all transformed normal
form games g(h) for all outcomes h of plays effected by subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
strategy profiles in the PNG.
4.5 Disagreements
Clearly, players would only be interested in making preplay offers inducing payoffs that are
“optimal” for them. Therefore, rational players are expected to “negotiate” in the preplay
phase the play of Pareto optimal outcomes. In particular, if the game has a unique strictly
Pareto dominant outcome then the players can negotiate a transformation of the game to
make it the (unique) dominant strategy equilibrium. Yet, players that are getting lesser
shares of the total payoff may still want to negotiate a redistribution, so even in this case
the outcome of the preplay negotiations is not a priori obvious. In particular, there is no
guarantee that the PNG will ever terminate, i.e. that its solution is non-empty.
The PNG may terminate if all players pass at some stage, in which case we say that
the players have reached agreement, or may go on forever, in which case the players have
failed to reach agreement; we call such situation a (passive) disagreement and we denote
any such infinite history with D. We will not discuss disagreements and their consequences
here, but will make the explicit assumption that any agreement is better for every player than
disagreement in terms of the payoffs, by assigning payoffs of −∞ in the entire game for each
player if the PNG evolves as a disagreement. However, we also outline a more flexible and
possibly more realistic alternative, whereby players can explicitly express tentative agreements
with the status quo before every move they make, essentially by saying “So far so good, but let
me try to improve the game further by offering . . . ”, or express disagreements, by essentially
saying “No, I am not happy with the way the negotiations have developed since the last time
I agreed, so I’d like to improve the game by offering instead . . . ”. This type of negotiations
involves, besides the other moves listed above, also formal statements of acceptance or non-
acceptance of the current NFG, where the input NFG is automatically accepted by all players
and at every stage of the negotiations, the current NFG is the one on which they are currently
negotiating by making offers, whereas the currently accepted NFG is the last current one for
which all players have explicitly stated acceptance. Then if at any stage of the PNG any player
is currently unhappy and realizes that he cannot improve further because of the other players
not willing to accept his best conditional offers, then he can terminate the negotiations by
explicitly opting out, which would leave as an outcome game the currently accepted NFG.
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4.6 Preplay negotiations games and assumptions on players’ rationality
In order to understand how solutions of preplay negotiation games look we need to understand
the equilibria of PNGs. This seems a very complex problem and its analysis crucially depends
on the specific optional assumptions that we make regarding the types of allowed moves, value
of time, and most importantly – the players’ common rationality assumptions in the PNG.
While our analysis of games with conditional offers will be based on a standard SPE
analysis — which allows for a direct connection with bargaining games — for the case of
unconditional offers we discuss and adopt what we call an immediate rationality assumption,
i.e., we study players that calculate optimal offers on a given NFG without considering the
possible extensions of the preplay negotiation game after the immediate expected response
to their move. The difference is that in the general case a player may afford making a ‘sub-
optimal’ move in the play of a PNG, transforming the currently accepted game into one
with a lesser value for that player, with the expectation, justified by a long-term rationality
assumption, that the opponent will not opt out but will continue the negotiation for the sake of
reaching a mutually better outcome, reasoning likewise. On the other hand, in the restricted
case of Immediate Rationality Assumption, hereafter abbreviated as IRA, an optimal strategy
of a player would only prescribe moves that would guarantee that the resulting transformed
NFG has a no lesser value for the player making that move than the currently accepted NFG.
To put it simple, IRA implies that players are short-sighted and prescribes to them to play
optimal, but ‘locally safe’ strategies in the PNG. This assumption is often justified, e.g., when
players have no a priori knowledge about each rationality and patience and also makes the
analysis somewhat easier, but by no means trivial, as we will see further. As the analysis in
the case of many-player PNGs is still very complicated and cannot be presented in a single
paper, hereafter we restrict attention to the 2-player case. In order to carry our such analysis
and to make statements about existence of ‘good’ solutions assuming IRA, we first need to
discuss the notions of ‘feasibility of moves’ and ‘efficiency of negotiation strategies’. In this
context we will use the term “efficient” not in its standard game-theoretic sense, i.e., by
applying it to outcomes, but to the way outcomes are reached.
4.6.1 Feasible offers and moves
In principle, players can make offers that would induce transformations decreasing their ex-
pected value of the game. Generally, such offers would not be rational to make under the IRA,
but they may be still be admissible in some circumstances, e.g., when conditional offers are
not allowed but withdrawals of offers are. We say that a player’s offer is weakly feasible if
it does not decrease that player’s expected value of the game in the game transformed by that
offer; the offer is feasible if it strictly increases that expected value. This is a generic notion
of feasibility of offers, which needs to be extended further to the notion of feasible moves in
the PNG. The latter is specific to some of the optional additional assumptions which we will
discuss in more detail for the 2-player case in the next section. We argue that, assuming IRA,
in order for a player’s strategy in the preplay negotiation phase to be a part of a rational
solution, it must only involve weakly feasible moves.
4.6.2 Minimal offers
With their preplay offers players want to create incentives for the other players to play desired
strategies. So, feasibility is a necessary condition for an offer to be made in an actually played
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PGM, but it is not sufficient for it to be a part of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
Clearly, an optimal offer from a player to another would be a minimal feasible one providing
a sufficient incentive for the recipient of the offer to play the desired transformation, but not
more than that. The question of what is a minimal offer that achieves such objective crucially
depends on the adopted solution concept and, in particular, on the rationality assumptions
and reasoning skills of the recipient. For instance, if the players know the solution of the
starting normal form game G, induced by the adopted solution concept, then they also know
which outcomes can be selected among the ones surviving the iterated elimination process.
Thereafter, if a player A wants to induce with a preplay offer another player B to play a
given strategy σB then, for any acceptable solution concept, it would suffice for A to make
any sufficiently large offer that would turn σ into a strictly dominant strategy for B. But, such
offer may be prohibitively costly or, depending on the solution concept and the rationality
assumptions for B, unnecessarily generous. For instance, when a player B receives an offer
A
δ/σB−−−→ B, he should naturally expect that A considers playing A’s best response to σB,
so B can anticipate the outcome of the transformed game, and if B considers that outcome
better than his current expected value, that should suffice for A’s offer to work.
A technical detail: it is often the case that no minimal offer exists that guarantees to
achieve the objective, e.g., to turn the desired strategy into a strictly dominant one. For
instance, if it suffices for A to pay to B any amount that is greater than d for that purpose,
then any offer of d + , for  > 0, should do. Clearly, however, there is a practical minimum
beyond which a player in question would not bother optimizing any further, so we will often
refer to offers of payments d+ meaning d +  for ‘sufficiently small  > 0’ without specifying
the value of , but still allowing its further reduction, as long as it remains strictly positive.
4.6.3 Efficient negotiation strategies
Definition 3 (Efficient negotiation strategies) A strategy in the PNG is an efficient ne-
gotiation strategy if it only involves making (minimal) feasible offers, it passes once they are
accepted, and – in the case when conditional offers are allowed – at no point prescribes with-
drawal of earlier made offers. It is strongly efficient if the vector of payoffs of the outcome it
attains is a redistribution of the vector of payoffs of a maximal outcome.
A number of important relevant questions arise:
• Is it the case that every subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategy of a PNG is an
efficient negotiation strategy and vice versa?
• If not, can the inefficient ones be replaced by efficient ones generating the same, or at
least as good solution?
• Under what conditions can a given (maximal) Pareto optimal outcome in the starting
NFG become the unique outcome of the final NFG?
To answer these questions we need an analysis of the solutions of the PNG game. Further
we provide such partial analysis for the case of two players.
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5 Two-player preplay negotiation games with unconditional
offers
We begin with the case of more restricted preplay negotiations, where conditional offers are
not possible, or not allowed. As we will see further, the strategic reasoning in such preplay
negotiations games is rather different from the case with conditional offers, because any
player who makes an unconditional offer puts himself in a disadvantaged position by offering
unilaterally a payment to the other player and thus transforming the payoff matrix to the other
player’s advantage. Therefore, generally, players are more interested in receiving, rather than
in making, unconditional offers and this affects essentially the preplay negotiations phase.
According to the Immediate Rationality Assumption IRA, here we focus on the locally
rational behavior of players exchanging unconditional offers, by first determining the best
(for the offerer) rational unconditional offer that a player can make on a given 2-player
NFG. Then we illustrate with some examples possible evolutions and outcomes of the preplay
negotiation phase consisting of exchanging such best offers and draw some conclusions. In
other words, here we analyze and illustrate the rationality of moves, rather than full-blown
strategies, suggesting that every good notion of IRA-compliant equilibrium used to analyze
PNGs without conditional offers should take this rationality into account. We leave untreated
for now the question of how the value of time affects the outcomes of the preplay negotiations
games in this case, by tacitly assuming that time is not valuable.
5.1 The effect of allowing withdrawals of unconditional offers
We first argue that when withdrawals of unconditional offers are allowed, conditional offers
can be simulated, too, even though at the cost of some time delay. Indeed, if player A wants
to make a conditional offer A
α/Bj | β/Ai−−−−−−−−→ B she can make the unconditional offer A α/Bj−−−→ B
expecting the matching (or better) unconditional offer B
β/Ai−−−→ A from B. How can the
receiver B guess the expected matching offer, if side communication is not possible or not
allowed? Note that the offer A
α/Bj−−−→ B has 2 effects: it changes the payoff table in a way
beneficial for B and indicates that player A wants player B to play Bj . Therefore, B can
naturally expect that (disregarding for a moment all other offers) A intends to play her best
response to Bj . However, an offer from B to A may change A’s best response to Bj in a way,
that would make it more beneficial for A, and at least as beneficial for B, if A plays another
strategy, say Ai. By inspecting the possibilities B can identify his options for matching offers
that would make A’s unconditional offer worth her while. If B has more than one such
options, he can guess and try. If the expected matching offer is not received in the next round
of the preplay negotiations, A can subsequently withdraw her offer, thus indicating that her
expectations were not met, but later can make it again, possibly repeating this ‘ritual’ until
B eventually realizes what is expected from him and offers it (or until A gives up expecting).
Thus, the case of unconditional offers with withdrawals is essentially reducible to the case
where conditional offers are allowed, treated further. We only note here that when time is
valuable the simulation suggested above may be costly and leading to side effects.
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5.2 Preplay negotiations with unconditional offers and no withdrawals
The case when no withdrawals of offers are allowed is essentially different. As we will see
further, in this case the players can be genuinely disadvantaged by making the first offer,
and this can be crucial for the outcome of the negotiations. We can distinguish 3 types of
unconditional offers:
1. vacuous offers, of the kind A
0/σ−−→ B for payment of 0. These can be used instead
of passing, but also, more importantly, as a kind of signaling, i.e., indication that A
expects B to play σ, for breaking the symmetry in case of symmetric games with several
equivalent optimal equilibria.
2. -offers, of the kind A
/σ−−→ B for a small enough  > 0. These can be used similarly, for
breaking the symmetry, when B has more than one best for him moves which, however,
yield different payoffs for A. Using such a move, A can make any of these strictly
preferable for B and, thus, can turn a weak equilibrium into a strict one, with minimal
cost.
3. effective offers, of the kind A
d/σ−−→ B for a (large enough) d > 0. These are the
standard offers used to change the recipient’s preferences and influence his choice of
strategy in the 2nd phase.
It is easy to see that in ideal two-players negotiations none of them needs to make two
consecutive offers, between which the opponent has passed or made a vacuous offer. Indeed,
no player would be better off by making offers in the same game contingent on two or more
different strategies of the opponent; in fact, such multiple offers send to the opponent confusing
signals. Furthermore, two or more offers by the same player that are contingent on the same
strategy of the opponent can be combined into one. So, leaving aside the question of who
starts the preplay negotiations game, in the case where only unconditional and irrevocable
offers are allowed, the PNG consists of a sequence of alternating offers made in turn by the two
players until both of them pass. Thus, in order to capture the notion of efficient negotiations
in this case, we need to analyze the question of what are the best unconditional and irrevocable
offers that a player can make on a given NFG?
5.3 Computing the best unconditional offers of a player
What is an IRA-based rational player’s reasoning when considering making an unconditional
and irrevocable offer to another player in a given NFG G? Suppose, player A considers making
such an offer to player B. Then, for each strategy Bj of B, player A considers making an
offer contingent on B playing Bj . To make sure that B will play Bj in the resulting game,
it suffices to make the latter a strictly dominant strategy for B. The necessary payment for
that, however, can be prohibitively high for A because after that payment A’s best response
to Bj may yield a worse payoff than the current (e.g., maxmin) expected value for A of the
original game. So, a more subtle reasoning is needed, presented by the following procedure.
1. For each strategy Bj of B, player A looks at her best response to Bj . Suppose for now
that it is unique, say Aij . Then, this is what B would expect A to play if B knows
that A expects B to play Bj . In this case, A computes the minimal payment needed
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to make Bj not necessarily a strictly dominant strategy, but a best response to Aij ,
i.e., the minimal payment that would make the strategy profile σij ,j = (Aij , Bj) a Nash
equilibrium. That payment is
δAij ,j = maxk
(uB(Aij , Bk)− uB(σij ,j)).
If it is positive, or is 0 but reached not only for k = j but also for other values of k,
then, in order to break B’s indifference and make σij ,j a strict Nash equilibrium, A has
to add to δAij ,j a small enough  > 0, thus eventually producing the minimal necessary
payment δAj .
2. If A’s best response to Bj is not unique, then A should compute the minimal payment
δAj needed to make Bj the best response of B to each of A’s best responses to Bj .
Clearly, that should be the maximum of all δAij ,j computed above, possibly plus a small
enough  > 0.
3. Once δAj is computed, A computes her expected payoff in the transformed game ĜBj
after an offer A
δAj /Bj−−−−→ B, which is:
vA(ĜBj ) = uA(σij ,j)− δAj .
4. Finally, A maximizes over j:
vA(Ĝ) = max
j
vA(ĜBj ).
If the maximum is achieved for more than one j, then A can choose any of them, or
–better – the one yielding the least payoff for B, thus stimulating B to make her a
further offer.
If this maximum is 0 and reached for only one value of j, then there is no need for A
to make any offer, because in this case there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the game
and A cannot make any offer that would improve on her payoff yielded by that Nash
equilibrium. If the maximum is 0, but reached for more than one values of j, then A
must still make a vacuous offer A
0/Bj−−−→ B in order to indicate to B for which Nash
equilibrium she will play.
The reasoning for B is symmetric, eventually producing the value vB(Ĝ).
The definition of vA(Ĝ) implies the following:
Proposition 4 Given the NFG G, the value vA(Ĝ) is the best payoff that player A can guar-
antee as a result of the players playing any Nash equilibrium induced by an unconditional offer
from A to B in the transformed game.
It is now up to player A to decide whether to make the respective offer leading to the
value vA(Ĝ) – if that offer would improve her current expected value – or to pass, possibly by
making only a vacuous offer, for the sake of indicating to B on which of the several equivalent
Nash equilibria to coordinate (as in the symmetric coordination game), when appropriate.
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Example 5 (Solving a game by exchange of unconditional offers)
Consider the following NFG G between players R (row) and C (column):
C1 C2 C3
R1 2, 10 10, 4 5, 1
R2 6, 0 4, 4 6, 3
This game has no pure strategy NE. The maxmin solution is (R2, C2) with payoffs (4, 4),
which is not Pareto optimal.
Suppose, player R is to make the first offer. Let us compute the best offer that R can make
to C. (We will often denote d+  by d+ and d−  by d−.)
• The best response of R to C1 is R2.
So, δR2,1 = 4− 0 +  = 4+ and vR(ĜC1) = 6− 4+ = 2−
• The best response of R to C2 is R1.
So, δR1,2 = 10− 4 +  = 6+ and vR(ĜC2) = 10− 6+ = 4−.
• The best response of R to C3 is R2.
So, δR2,3 = 4− 3 +  = 1+ and vR(ĜC3) = 6− 1+ = 5−.
Thus, vR(Ĝ) = vR(ĜC3) = 5−, meaning that R’s best offer to C is R 1
+ / C3−−−−−→ C. The
resulting transformed game is
C1 C2 C3
R1 2, 10 10, 4 4−, 2+
R2 6, 0 4, 4 5−, 4+
It has one Nash equilibrium (R2, C3) yielding payoffs (5−, 4+) which are strictly better than
the players maxmin values, but not yet Pareto optimal.
Now, let us compute the best offer of C to R in the transformed game.
• The best response of C to R1 is C1 and δC1,1 = 4+. So, vC(ĜR1) = 10− 4+ = 6−.
• The best response of C to R2 is C3 and δC2,3 = 0. Thus, vC(ĜR2) = 5−.
So, vC(Ĝ) = 6−, which is better than C’s current value of 4+. Thus, C can improve his
value by making the offer C
4+ / R1−−−−−→ R. The resulting transformed game is
C1 C2 C3
R1 6+, 6− 14+, 0− 8,−2
R2 6, 0 4, 4 5−, 4+
It has one Nash equilibrium (R1, C1), where the strategy R1 is strictly dominant for R,
yielding payoffs (6+, 6−) which are strictly better than the previous ones of (5−, 4+), but not
yet Pareto optimal. So, let us see whether R can improve any further the resulting game,
given that the strategy R1 is already his best response to all strategies of C:
• For C1: δR1,1 = 0 and vR(ĜC1) = 6−
• For C2: δR1,2 = 6− − 0− +  = 6+ and vR(ĜC2) = 14+ − 6+ = 8.
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• For C3: δR1,3 = 6− − 2 +  = 8 and vR(ĜC3) = 8− 8 = 0.
Thus, vR(Ĝ) = vR(ĜC2) = 8, which is better than R’s current value of 6+, hence R’s best
offer to C now is R
6+ / C2−−−−−→ C. The resulting transformed game is
C1 C2 C3
R1 6+, 6− 8, 6 8,−2
R2 6, 0 −2−, 10+ 5−, 4+
It has a strictly dominant strategies equilibrium (R1, C2) yielding payoffs (8, 6) which are
strictly better than the previous ones (6+, 6−). In fact, this is the only Pareto maximal outcome
in the game, and one can now check that none of the players can make any further improving
offers. Thus, this is the end of the negotiation phase.
We leave to the reader to check that, if C makes the first offer, the negotiation phase will
end with a slightly different game but with the same solution, and after each player making
only one offer. As we will see further, such confluence is not always the case.
5.4 Weakness of unconditional offers
The example above demonstrates the potential power of unconditional offers to solve normal
form games. On the other hand, the version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game in Figure 4
demonstrate their weakness, showing that in preplay negotiation games where no conditional
offers and no withdrawals are allowed the players may be unable to reach any Pareto optimal
outcome by means of exchanging feasible preplay offers. Moreover, the expected value of the
game, that a player can achieve by making an effective unconditional offer in such a preplay
negotiations game, can be worse than the original expected value of the game yielded by the
maxmin strategy profile, for every player.
5.5 The disadvantage of making the first unconditional offer
Even when each of the players can start an effective negotiation ending with a solved game,
the solution may essentially depend on who makes the first effective offer, as shown by the
next example.
Example 6 (Making the first offer can be disadvantageous) The reader can check that
in the following game between R and C
C1 C2
R1 1, 8 10, 4
R2 4, 10 1, 11
R3 4, 0 2, 2
if the first offer is made by R the preplay negotiation game ends with
C1 C2
R1 1, 8 6−, 8+
R2 4, 10 −3−, 15+
R3 4, 0 −2−, 6+
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where the only acceptable (surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies) out-
come is (R1, C2) yielding payoffs (6−, 8+), whereas if the first offer is made by C the preplay
negotiation game ends with
C1 C2
R1 4+, 5− 9, 5
R2 4, 10 −3−, 15+
R3 4, 0 −2−, 6+
where the only acceptable outcome is again (R1, C2), but now yielding payoffs (9, 5). Note
that in both cases the disadvantaged player is the one who has made the first offer.
The example above also indicates that, in the case under consideration, the greedy ap-
proach, where a player always makes the best effective offer he can, may not be his best
strategy. Passing the turn to the other player – that is, making a vacuous offer – could be
strategically more beneficial. On the other hand, if both players keep exchanging only vacu-
ous offers or passing, then they will never improve their expected values of the starting game.
Yet, one can check that any pair of strategies in the example above, whereby one of the player
takes the initiative by making the first effective move with his best first offer and thereafter
always responds with his currently best effective offers until possible and then passing, while
the other player remains passive until that happens and thereafter keeps responding with her
best offers until possible and then passing, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy in the
preplay negotiation phase for that game.
Stocktaking We have demonstrated that, on the one hand, by exchanging only uncondi-
tional and irrevocable offers players can often achieve mutually better outcomes of normal
form games, but on the other hand their bargaining powers to achieve their best outcomes
in such games can be substantially affected by the potential disadvantage of making the first
effective offer in such games. Consequently, the strategy profile based on always making the
currently best offer need not always be a Nash equilibrium. We therefore believe that the
analysis of PNG with unconditional offers warrants the use of equilibria that go beyond the
IRA assumptions. Also, features such as using vacuous offers for signaling a future intention
on the strategy to be played become essential. Such analysis should take into account equi-
libria generated both by forward induction-like reasoning, where past moves can be used to
justify rational behavior in the future (see [OR94]). We leave the overall analysis of this case
and the further investigation of the best negotiation strategies and the analysis of the effect of
valuable time, to future work. It is not yet known precisely what additional conditions guar-
antee existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for preplay negotiaitons with unconditional
offers. This question is left to future study.
6 Two-players preplay negotiation games with conditional of-
fers
In this section we allow the possibility of players to make conditional offers to each other
and obtain results about the efficiency of the resulting negotiation process and its possible
outcomes, under several optional assumptions. The content of this section extends our work
in [GT13].
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Before analyzing some cases with additional optional assumptions, let us state a useful
general result, also valid in the case of many players PNG. An extensive form game is said
to have the One Deviation Property (ODP) [OR94, Lemma 98.2] if, in order to check
that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in (some subgame of) that game, it suffices to
consider the possible profitable deviations of each player not amongst all of its strategies (in
that subgame), but only amongst the ones differing from the considered profile in the first
subsequent move.
Lemma 7 Every PNG has the One Deviation Property.
Proof. Let E = (N,A,H, turn, {ΣA,ΣB}, o,G,S,g,u) be a PNG, and Hf ⊆ H the set
of finite histories in H. Let moreover Ef be the restriction of E to Hf , where the individual
components are defined in the expected way. But Ef is a game of finite horizon, and by [OR94,
Lemma 98.2] it has the One Deviation Property. But by the fact that no disagreement is better
for any player than any agreement, (Definition 2) then E has that property, too.
Furthermore, to analyze equilibrium strategies of PNG we consider so called stationary
acceptance strategies where players have a minimal acceptance threshold d and a minimal
passing threshold d′ ≥ d (both of which may vary among the players).
6.1 Conditional offers with non-valuable time
The value for a player of a history in a PNG is the value for the player of the current NFG
associated with that history. When time is not valuable players assign the same value to
the NFG associated with the current moment and the same game associated with any other
moment in the future, which means that players can afford delaying or withdrawing offers at
no extra cost.
Proposition 8 Every SPE strategy profile of stationary acceptance strategies of a two-player
PNG with non-valuable time is strongly efficient.
Proof. Suppose not. Let d− be a vector of expected values that is not the redistribution
of a maximal outcome of the starting game, associated to some SPE strategy profile. Such
strategy profile yields a history h that ends with: 1) proposal of d−; 2) acceptance of that
proposal; 3) pass; 4) pass. Consider now some redistribution d∗ of a maximal outcome where
both players get more than in d− and the history h with the the last four steps substituted
by: 1) proposal of d∗; 2) acceptance of that proposal; 3) pass; 4) pass. By stationarity of
strategies and the ODP, the player moving at step 1) is better off deviating from d− and
instead proposing d∗: a contradiction.
The condition of stationarity of acceptance strategies is needed if we want to prevent
SPE that lead to inefficiency. Indeed, if players were not adhering to stationary acceptance
strategies there could be a suboptimal outcome, guaranteeing for both players expected values
respectively of dA and dB. To enforce that outcome it then suffices to design a strategy profile
whereby off the equilibrium path player A threatens player B with a stubborn but maximal
stationary acceptance strategy giving him less than dB, while player B threatens A with an
expected payoff of strictly less than dA. So, if players are not obliged to be consistent in their
acceptance policies, dA and dB can be the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
The example below provides a detailed instance of such games.
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Example 9 (Attaining inefficiency) In what follows we say that a player ‘proposes a given
outcome with a given payoff distribution’ to mean that the player makes a conditional offer
which, when accepted, would make that specific outcome, with that specific distribution of the
payoffs, the unique (dominant strategy equilibrium) outcome in the solution of the transformed
game. More generally, we say that a player ”proposes a payoff distribution” to mean that
the player makes a conditional offer which, when accepted, would make that specific payoff
distribution the vector of expected utilities of the players.
Consider the starting NFG on Figure 7. As there are no dominant strategy equilibria,
there are acceptable solution concepts assigning 2 to each player.
L R
U 2, 2 4, 3
D 3, 3 2, 2
Figure 7: Attaining inefficient divisions
We now will construct a strategy profile of the PNG starting from that game, that is a
SPE strategy profile and attains an inefficient outcome:
1. At the root node player A proposes outcome (D,L) with payoffs (3, 3).
2. After such proposal player B accepts. However, if A had made a different offer (so, off
the equilibrium path) B would reject and keep proposing outcome (U,R) with distribution
of 5 for him and 2 for A and accepting (and passing on) maximal outcomes guaranteeing
him at least 5. A, on the other hand, would not have better option than proposing
the same distribution (5 for B and 2 for her) and accepting only maximal outcomes
guaranteeing her at least 2. Notice that once they enter this subgame neither A nor B
can profitably deviate from such distribution.
3. If, however, B did not accept the (3, 3) deal then A would keep proposing outcome (U,R)
with a redistribution of (5, 2) (5 for her, 2 for him) and accepting at least that much.
Respectively, B would also stick to the same distribution, accepting at least 2. Again,
no player can profitably deviate from this stationary strategy profile starting from B’s
rejection.
4. After player B has accepted the deal (3, 3), then A passes. If A did not pass, player B
would go back to his (2, 5) redistribution threat.
Likewise with the next round. That eventually leads to the inefficient outcome (3, 3).
It is easy to check that the strategy profile described above is a SPE. No player can at any
point deviate profitably by proposing the outcome (U,L) with dominating payoff distribution,
e.g., (3.5, 3.5) .
We first focus on PNG where the opt out option is not available, and introduce it as an
additional feature later on.
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Negotiations without ’opt out’ moves In PNG with non-valuable time and without
the possibility of opting out every redistribution of a maximal outcome can be attained as a
solution.
Proposition 10 Let E be PNG with non-valuable time starting from a NFG G and let d =
(xA, xB) be any redistribution of a maximal outcome of the starting NFG. The following
strategy profile σ = (σA, σB) is a SPE:
For each player i ∈ {A,B}:
• if i is the first player to move, he proposes a transformation of G where the vector of
expected values in the transformed game is d;
• when i can make an offer and the previously made offer has not been accepted, he
proposes a transformation of the current NFG where the vector of expected values in the
transformed game is d;
• when i can make an offer and the previously made offer has been accepted, he passes;
• when i has a pending offer of a suggested transformation where the vector of expected
values in the transformed game is d′, he accepts it if and only if x′i ≥ xi, and rejects it
otherwise;
• i never withdraws any previously made offer;
• if i can pass and the other player has just passed, he passes;
• if i can pass and the opponent has not just passed, i proposes d;
• if i has just accepted a proposal he passes;
Proof. We have to show that there is no subgame where a player i can profitably deviate
from this strategy at its root. By Lemma 7 it suffices to consider only first move deviations
to the above described strategy.
Suppose the player has a pending offer that induces a transformation of the current NFG
where the vector of expected values is d∗. If she accepts it then the outcome will be d∗, due
to the definition of the strategy profile; if she rejects it, it will be the starting offer d. And she
will accept if and only if she will get more from d∗ than from d. So the acceptance component
is optimal. For the remaining cases, if player i deviates from the prescribed strategy, due to
the construction of the strategy and Lemma 7, the vector of payoffs associated to the outcome
of E will be d anyway.
Corollary 11 The game associated to the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
profile consisting of stationary acceptance strategies in a two-player PNG with non-valuable
time is optimally solvable.
In summary, our analysis of two-player PNG with non-valuable time shows that efficiency
can be attained when conditional offers are allowed and stationary acceptance strategies are
followed. Indeed, any redistribution of the vector of payoffs of a maximal outcome can be
made the unique solution of the final NFG by such SPE strategies. However, non-stationary
acceptance strategies may lead to inefficient equilibria, as Example 9 clearly shows: there
exist SPE strategy profiles of a two-player PNG with conditional offers and non-valuable
time where (i) offers are made that are not feasible, (ii) the vector of payoffs of the outcome
it attains is not a redistribution of the vector of payoffs of a maximal outcome, i.e., it is not
strongly efficient.
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Negotiations with ‘opt out’ moves. To address the issues related to possible inefficiency
we consider the possibility for players to make an opt out move and unilaterally put an end
to the negotiations, by making the currently accepted NFG the outcome of the whole PNG.
Proposition 12 Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile of a PNG with opt
out move and let h be the resulting history. Then σ guarantees to all players at least as much
as they had in the currently accepted NFG; in particular, at least as much as in the original
game.
Proof. Starting with the original, automatically accepted game, each currently accepted
NFG must make each player better off than in the previous one; otherwise opting out would
be a profitable deviation.
By introducing the possibility of opting out, the set of subgame perfect equilibria reduces
further. Strategies, such as the one described in Example 9 demanding an unreasonably
high reward or an unreasonably low one for the proponent, will not be equilibria anymore.
However, this option does not solve the problem of attaining inefficiency, as the comment
to Proposition 8 still applies. It has, however, several advantages: first, the equilibrium
strategies of the PNG will guarantee for both players at least the expected payoff of the
starting NFG; and second, the threat of opting out gives the players the possibility of making
a more effective use of unconditional offers.
To sum up, while SPE strategies in a two-player PNG can attain efficiency, some important
issues are still remaining:
• some SPE strategies, e.g., non-stationary acceptance strategies, are not strongly effi-
cient.
• players can keep making unfeasible moves as a part of a SPE strategy, i.e., there are
forms of equilibria where some players strictly decrease their expected payoff with re-
spect to the original game;
• even strongly efficient strategies do not always yield perfectly solved games, as there is
no notion of most fair redistribution of the payoff vectors in the solution of the original
game.
Thus, when time is of no value, even the possibility of making conditional offers does not
guarantee that fair and efficient outcomes are ever reached.
6.2 Conditional offers with valuable time
We will show here that when time is of value the problems mentioned above can be at least
partially solved. To impose value on time we introduce for each player i a payoff discounting
factor δi ∈ (0, 1) applied at every round of the PNG associated to offers that are made to his
payoffs. These factors measure the players’ impatience, i.e., how much they value time, and
reduce the payoffs accordingly as time goes by. Thus, the players have no interest in delaying
the negotiations by making redundant moves, sub-optimal or subsequently withdrawn offers.
The intuition now, which we will justify further, is that for the sake of time efficiency, in a
SPE strategy profile:
1. If a player intends to make an offer, she has never made any earlier offer that, if accepted,
would give her a lesser value of the resulting game.
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2. If any player is ever going to accept a given offer (or any other offer which is at least as
good for her) she should do it the first time when she receives such offer.
In analyzing PNG with valuable time we consider several cases, depending on whether
withdrawals and opting out are allowed.
6.2.1 No withdrawals and no opting out
For technical reasons we impose some additional constraints:
• every game associated with a history of a PNG does not have in its solution outcomes
assigning negative utility to players. NB: we do allow payoff vectors consisting of neg-
ative reals to be present in the game matrix, only we do not allow such vectors to be
associated to outcomes in the solution. This constraint has several practical conse-
quences:
– players’ expected payoffs decrease in time, i.e., the discounting factor δ has always
a negative effect on the expected payoff.
– players can make offers that redistribute the payoff vectors associated with out-
comes in the solution, leaving some nonnegative amount to each player and some
strictly positive amount to some.
• each player’s expected payoff at a disagreement history is assumed 0.
We will use the following notational conventions:
• (x, t) denotes the payoff vector x at time t, where each component xi is discounted by
δti ; (x, t)i is the payoff of player i in the vector x at t.
• GX will denote the set of all possible redistributions of payoffs of outcomes in a NFG
G that assign nonnegative payoffs to all players. This set is compact, but generally not
connected, as in the bargaining games of [4]. However, it is a finite union of compact
and connected sets, and that will suffice to generalize the results from [4] that we need.
The following properties of every 2-person PNG with valuable time starting from a given
NFG G are the four fundamental assumptions of the bargaining model in [Rub82] and [OR94,
p.122].
1. For each x, y ∈ GX such that x 6= y, if (x, 0)i = (y, 0)i then (x, 0)−i 6= (y, 0)−i. This
holds because the set GX is made by payoff vectors and subtracting some payoff to a
player means adding it to the other.
2. (bi, 1)−i = (bi, 0)−i = (D)−i, where bi is the highest payoff that i obtains in GX and
(D)−i the payoff for −i in any disagreement history. As bi is the best agreement for
player i it is also the worst one for player −i.
3. If x is Pareto optimal amongst the payoff vectors in GX then, by definition of GX , there
is no y with (x, 0)i ≥ (y, 0)i for each i ∈ N . Moreover, x is a redistribution of a maximal
outcome in G.
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4. There is a unique pair (x∗, y∗) with x∗, y∗ ∈ GX such that (x∗, 1)A = (y∗, 0)A and (y∗, 1)B =
(x∗, 0)B and both x∗, y∗ are Pareto optimal amongst the payoff vectors in GX .
The first 3 statements above are quite straightforward. To see the last one, let x∗ =
(x∗A, x
∗
B) and y
∗ = (y∗A, y
∗
B) and let the sum of the payoffs in any maximal outcome in G
be d. Then (x∗A, x
∗
B, y
∗
A, y
∗
B) is the unique solution of the following, clearly consistent and
determined system of equations:
yA = δAxA, xB = δByB, xA + xB = d, yA + yB = d.
The solution (see also [OR94]) is:
xA = d
1− δB
1− δAδB ; yA = δAd
1− δB
1− δAδB
xB = δBd
1− δA
1− δAδB ; yB = d
1− δA
1− δAδB .
Relation with bargaining games In the rest of the section we will explicitly view preplay
negotiation as a bargaining process on how to play the starting normal form game. Using our
observations and assumptions, we can adapt the results from [OR94] to show that when time is
valuable not only all equilibria consisting of stationary acceptance strategies attain efficiency
but they also do so by redistributing the payoff vector in relation to players’ impatience.
Stationary acceptance strategies will be needed to focus only on the maximal connected
subspace of the set GX . We extend the efficiency and fairness results obtained in [OR94]
for bargaining games of the type of ‘division of a cake’ to somewhat more general bargaining
games of the type where players have to choose a cake from a set of cakes, of possibly
different sizes and divide it. Our claim, in a nutshell, is that, when players employ stationary
acceptance strategies, they immediately choose the largest cake and then bargain on how to
divide it.
First, recall that in our framework time passes as new offers are made. So, from a technical
point if the PNG start with a game that is already perfectly solved, the player moving first
will not be punished by passing immediately.
Then, without restriction of the generality of our analysis, we can assume a unique dis-
counting factor for both players. Indeed, the discount factor of e.g., player A can be made
equal to that of B while preserving the relative preferences of A on the set of outcomes by
suitably re-scaling the payoffs of A in the input NFG, and therefore the expected value for
A of that game; for technical details see [OR94, p.119] following an idea of Fishburn and
Rubinstein quoted there.
Now we are ready to state the main result for this case:
Theorem 13 Let (x∗, y∗) be the unique pair of payoff vectors defined above. Then, in a
PNG with valuable time starting from a NFG G with a unique discounting factor δ for both
players, the strategy of player A in every subgame perfect equilibrium consisting of stationary
acceptance strategies satisfies the following (to obtain the strategy for B simply swap x∗ and
y∗):
• if A is the first player to move, then she ’proposes’ outcome x∗, i.e., makes a condi-
tional offer that, if accepted, would update the game into one with a dominant strategy
equilibrium yielding the Pareto maximal outcome x∗ as payoff vector;
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• when A has a pending offer y′, she accepts it if and only if the payoff she gets in y′ is
at least as much as in y∗;
• if A can pass, she passes if and only if the expected value associated to the proposed
game y′A is at least y
∗
A; otherwise she proposes x
∗.
Proof. It is easy to check, using the ODP, that no player can improve at any history
of the game by deviating from this strategy. Consider for instance the case when player A
at time t can choose whether to pass or not on the proposal of a distribution z on which
player B has already passed. If A passes then the payoff vector will be (z, t); if not, it will be
(x∗, t+ 1) . Obviously (z, t)A ≥ (x∗, t+ 1)A if and only if (z, 0)A ≥ (x∗, 1)A = (y∗, 0)A, so the
a,cceptance rule is optimal. The reasoning for the other cases is similar.
To prove the claim we use a variant of the argument given in [OR94] for bargaining games,
summarized as follows. We first show [Step 1] that the best SPE payoff for player A in any
subgame G′A starting with her proposal and where G′ is the currently accepted game — let
us denote it by MA(G
′
A) — yields the same utility as the worst one — mA(G′A) — which,
in turn, is the payoff of A at x∗. The argument for B is symmetric. Then we show [Step
2] that in every SPE the initial proposal is x∗, which is immediately accepted by the other
player, followed by each player passing. Finally, we show [Step 3] that the acceptance and
the passing conditions given are shared by every SPE strategy profile.
[Step 1] WLOG let A be the player moving first and call G′A each subgame of the PNG
beginning with a proposal by player A and where G′ is the currently accepted NFG at its root
(GA is the game itself). Analogously let us call G′B each subgame of the PNG beginning with
a proposal by player B. For each player i let Mi(G′i) be the best SPE outcome that player
i can get from G′i, i.e., Mi(G′i) = sup{δtxi | there is a SPE of G′i consisting of stationary
acceptance strategies with value (x, t)i}. Let mi(G′i) be the corresponding infimum. Recall
that bi is the highest payoff that i obtains in GX . Hereafter we write bij instead of (bi, 0)j for
i, j ∈ N . By our assumptions the observations above, bAB = bBA = 0.
We can now show that for each G′, MA(G′A) = mA(G′A) = x∗A and MB(G′B) = mB(G′B) =
y∗B. We first show that mB(G′B) ≥ bBB−δMA(G′A). Therefore, if player A rejects a proposal of
player B in the first period of G′B then she cannot get more than δMA(G′A). This means that
in any SPE of G′B she must accept any proposal giving her more than δMA(G′A) (otherwise
she could be at least as well off by rejecting it). Thus what is left for player B is no less than
bBB − δMA(G′A) in any SPE of G′B.
It is easy to see that MA(G′A) ≤ bAA − δmB(G′B), because player A cannot get more
than her best agreement minus what player B could guarantee with a rejection. That is,
player A needs to pay B with the difference between her ideal (appropriately discounted)
payoff and what B could guarantee alone. We can show now that MA(G′A) = x∗A. That
MA(G′A) ≥ x∗A is easily observed from the properties satisfied by every SPE and the fact that
each G′ is a transformation of G by conditional offers. To show that MA(G′A) ≤ x∗A we argue
the following. We know that δbAB = 0. We also know that δ(b
B
B − δbAA) > 0 = bAB = bBB − bAA.
In turn we have that bAA > b
A
A− (δ(bBB − δbAA)). By the previous observations we can conclude
that MA(G′A) ≤ bAA − (δ(bBB − δMA(G′A))). But, by a similar argument to that in the proof
of Proposition 8, MA is obtained from a strongly efficient SPE. So, as the set of maximal
outcomes in GX is compact and connected, it also follows that there exists UA ∈ [MA(G′A), bAA)
such that UA = b
A
A − (δ(bBB − δUA)). Now if MA(G′A) > x∗A then UA 6= x∗A. Then, taking
any pair of efficient agreements (a∗, b∗) such that a∗A = UA and b
∗
A = δUA we have obtained
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a pair of efficient agreements contradicting Property 6.2.1 (4). Similar reasoning shows that
mA(G′A) = x∗A,MB(G′B) = y∗B and finally mB(G′B) = y∗B.
[Step 2] Step 1 implies that if A is the first player to move, she starts by proposing x∗
which is immediately accepted. Likewise for player B.
[Step 3] Step 1 and 2 imply that every SPE shares the same acceptance and passing
condition. Consider first the acceptance condition. If B rejects an offer in G′A we go to G′B
where, by what was observed before, he gets y∗B. But y
∗
B = δx
∗
B so every proposal giving
him in G′A at least x∗B should be accepted, otherwise rejected. Putting everything together
we have that player B must accept any proposal giving him exactly x∗B. Similar reasoning
applies for the passing condition and for player A.
One important consequence of Theorem 13 is that every SPE strategy profile, consisting
of stationary acceptance strategies, of a two-player PNG with valuable time and with N =
{A,B} starting from G and with A (resp. B) first player to move induces a play h of length
4 and of value for player A of x∗A while for player B of δy
∗
B (resp. (y
∗
A, δx
∗
B) if B moves first).
To summarize, when time is valuable and players’ value of time (impatience) is measured
by a vector of discount factors δ and no withdrawals and opting out are allowed, the SPEs
following stationary acceptance strategies are essentially unique, efficient and redistribute a
maximal payoff vector in a fair way, depending on players’ impatience, viz. in each SPE play,
players agree as soon as possible and divide (almost) evenly any of the maximal outcomes in
the game. Thus, introducing value of time solves both problems of efficiency and fairness at
once.
7 Related work and comparisons
The present study has a rich pre-history and we do not purport to provide a comprehensive
citation of all related previous work and literature here, but will only mention various links
with earlier studies and then will discuss in more detail and compare with the most relevant
recent work.
7.1 Related topics and relevant early references
Here is a selection of related topics and relevant earlier references:
. To begin with, preplay offers technically fall broadly in the scope of externalities. There
is abundant literature on these, of which we only mention some of the early works: [Mea52],
[Mas94], [Var94], More specifically, preplay offers can be regarded as a special type of so called
in cooperative game theory side payments.
. Coase theorem, [Coa60] describes how efficiency of an allocation of goods or simply
an outcome can be obtained in presence of externalities, i.e. when actors’ possible decisions
affect positively or negatively the payoffs of the other actors involved. The claim, which is
usually provided in a rather informal fashion, states that if there are no transaction costs
and it is possible to bargain on the effect of the externalites, the process will lead to an
efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, i.e. regardless of who
is endowed with the capacity of performing the action in question.
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. [Ros75] proposes one of the earliest models of preplay negotiations, where ‘players suc-
cessively commit themselves irrevocably, according to a specified exogenous ordering, to coali-
tional strategies conditionally on the rest of the players in the coalition agreeing to play their
parts of the coalitional strategy’. He defines a special solution concept, the induced outcome,
and provides some sufficient conditions for its existence and uniqueness.
. Several two-stage games with preplay communication have been studied in the liter-
ature. They seem to go back to [Gut78] and [Gut87]. [Kal81] studies preplay negotiation
procedures as sequences of pre-defined length of “preplays”, each being a joint strategy of all
players. [MP89] consider preplay communication in the context of two-person sealed-bid dou-
ble auctions. [DS91] consider a 2-stage game for implementing Lindahl’s voluntary-exchange
mechanism. In a series of papers, incl. [Far98], Farrell considers two-stage games, with pre-
play ‘cheap talk’ followed by actual play, and discusses the role of preplay communication in
ensuring Nash equilibrium profile in the actual play. Also, [Wat91] studies two-stage 2-person
normal form games with preplay communication and [dGV80] study Stackelberg-solvable
games with preplay communication.
. Our preplay negotiation games are closely related to bargaining games, [Rub82, OR90,
OR94], [Mye97].
. Another related early work is [Var94] where he studies variations of ‘compensatory
mechanisms’ where, instead of making offers, players declare compensations for which they
are prepared to play one or another strategy (in favour of another player who is willing to pay
such compensation and makes a binding offer for it). Although the flavour of such variation
is somewhat different, technically it reduces to a type of games with preplay offers that we
have considered here.
. [FJK91], and more recently [MT09], consider the use of ‘agents’ or ’mediators’ playing
on behalf of the players, and show how such mechanisms can be used to achieve more efficient
outcomes in non-cooperative games.
. The idea of combining competition and cooperation in non-cooperative games has been
considered often since the early times of game theory, and has later evolved in theories of
co-opetition by [BN97] and more recently [CS11]. Related in spirit are some theories of
coalitional rationality, see [Amb09].
7.2 Detailed comparison with most relevant recent work
To our knowledge, Jackson and Wilkie have been the first to explicitly study arbitrary transfer
functions from one to another player in a normal form game. That work was preceded by
earlier relevant literature mentioned above, such as [Gut78, DS91, Var94, Qin02], where only
limited forms of payments were considered, such as payments proportional to the actions taken
by the other players or only contingent on own actions. Jackson and Wilkie’s framework bears
substantial similarities with ours, as it studies a two-stage transformations on a normal form
game where players announce transfers functions which update the initial normal form game
and then play the updated game. Jackson and Wilkie study the subgame perfect equilibria of
the two stage game and show under what conditions equilibria of the original game survive in
the update game. They focus on the 2-player case, but they also extend their results to the
N-player case. However, there are some essential conceptual and technical differences between
this framework and our, which we describe and discuss below. In [JW05]:
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. Transfers from a player A to a player B are of the form (in our notation) A
δ/σ−−→ B
where σ ∈ ∏i∈N Σi, δ ∈ R+ and δ = 0 whenever A = B, i.e. players are allowed to make
positive side payments to other players that are conditional on the entire strategy profile
played, and not only on the recipient’s individual strategy, as in our framework. Technically,
every unconditional offer from player A to player B can be simulated by a set of such transfers
from A to B. This is not the case for conditional offers, which would instead require a set
of transfers from B to A as well, or the possibility for δ to be negative, i.e. the introduction
of punishments. So, these two types of offers are generally incompatible. However, we see
the main importance of this difference as conceptual, rather than technical. We argue that
preplay offers based only on the opponents’ choice of actions are more natural and realistic
than those dependent also on own or other players’ actions, because of creating more explicit
and unambiguous incentives for the opponents. Indeed, if a player A makes an offer contingent
upon a certain strategy profile σ and hence, inter alia, on her playing a certain action σA,
then A creates positive incentives for the other players to play σ, but a possibly negative
incentive for herself to play σA. After all, if all other players take the bait and play σ then
A’s objective is already achieved, so rationally she should play her best response to σ−A in
the transformed game. If that action is different from σA then A would moreover save the
promised payments to the others because the strategy profile σ was not actually played!
. Players announce their transfer functions simultaneously. This is a reasonable choice in
situations where, e.g., players only have the possibility for once-off communication exchange
before the actual play, but it is not so in many others where they would rather negotiate on
their choice of actions, as it trivializes the whole preplay negotiation phase which is central
in our framework. In that sense, the framework of [JW05] and our have essentially different
scopes of applicability.
. The authors study strategies that can be supported, i.e. that they are subgame perfect
equilibria of the two-stage game and Nash-equilibria of the original game that also survive —
i.e. remain equilibria — in the updated game. In particular, they focus on the (interesting)
relation between the solo-payoff, i.e. the Nash equilibrium payoff that a player can guarantee
by making offers, and the supportability of strategies. Jackson and Wilkie show two important
results for the two-player case, the main bulk of their paper: (i) that every Nash equilibrium
x of the starting game survives if and only if it yields for every player i a utility that is
higher than the one given by i’s solo-payoff; and (ii) that a transfer function together with an
outcome are supportable if and only if they yield for every player i a utility that is higher than
the one given by i’s minimal solo-payoff, the solo-payoff obtained by making minimal offers.
It is worth noticing that the definition of minimal offer they adopt is essentially the one we
have adopted here: the minimal transfer function needed to change the game solution.
Ellingsen and Paltseva generalize Jackson and Wilkie’s work as follows:
. Transfers from a player A to a player B are again of the form A
δ/σ−−→ B where σ ∈∏
i∈N Σi, but now δ ∈ R and δ = 0 whenever A = B, i.e. players are allowed to propose both
rewards and punishments contingent upon entire strategy profiles. This boils down to players
not only making offers but also proposing contracts to the other players to sign or reject.
. The game played is composed of three stages: (i) the one in which players propose
contracts, (ii) the one in which players decide whether to sign a contract, (iii) the one in
which players play the game updated by the signed contract.
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. Contracts are proposed on mix strategies, and non-deterministic contracts are consid-
ered, i.e. it is possible to make randomize offers.
While in [JW05] each player A specifies the nonnegative transfer to the other players for
each pure strategy profile σ, in [EP11] each player specifies a (possibly negative) transfer to
the other players for each (possibly mixed) strategy profile σ and, at the same time, specifies
a signing decision for each contract of the other players. Ellingsen and Paltseva show that
their more general contracting game always has efficient equilibria. In particular they show
that all the efficient outcomes guaranteeing to each player at least as much as the worst
Nash-equilibrium payoff in the original game can be attained in some equilibrium.
[Yam05] considers variants of the games in [JW05] where one player moves before the
other and the move of the second ends the preplay phase, showing a clear advantage of the
latter player in improving is own payoff. In particular, Yamada shows that:
• the second player can always increase his original payoff, i.e. the payoff he gets in the
starting game, in every surviving Nash equilibrium
• every surviving Nash equilibrium that is also maximally Pareto optimal gives the second
player at least his original payoff
Clearly Yamada’s framework is a step closer to ours than Jackson and Wilkie’s. However
the games analyzed there are a rather restricted sort of Stackelberg games, where the second
player behaves like a dictator: not only can he best respond to the first player, but he can
unilaterally decide that the game will end with him improving his original payoff.
All in all, the message conveyed by this stream of contributions is that efficiency can
be reached if the structure of players’ offers is complex enough. On the one hand Jackson
and Wilkie show that promises are not enough to attain efficient outcomes, while Ellingsen
and Paltseva show that contracting is. Possibly only Yamada’s framework acknowledges that
the structure of the game might influence the preplay phase. Our results lie on a rather
different axis, as we restrict the type of offers to ones that only commit the proposer, not
the recipient, and focus on the effects that additional factors in the preplay negotiation
game, e.g. value of time, conditional offers and withdrawals, have on attaining outcomes
with desirable properties, such as efficiency and fairness. We also discuss how equilbirium
strategies themselves display desirable properties, i.e. being efficient negotiation strategies.
8 Further agenda and concluding remarks
The main purpose of the present paper is to initiate a systematic study of preplay negotiations
in non-cooperative games, and to outline a broad and long-term research agenda for that
study. We have indicated a number of conceptual and technical problems and have only
sketched some results, but still much work needs to be done. In particular, we identify two
natural and important directions of current and future extensions of our framework:
Coalitional offers. The analysis of N -player normal form games with preplay negotia-
tions phase, for N > 2, is much more complicated than the 2-players case. To begin with,
the benefit for a player A of player B playing a strategy induced by an offer from A to B
crucially depend on the strategies that the remaining players choose to play, so an offer from
a player to another player does not have the clear effect that it has in the 2-player case. Thus,
a player may have to make a collective offer to several (possibly all) other players in order to
orchestrate their plays in the best possible for him way. Furthermore, a player may be able
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to benefit in different ways by making offers for side payments to different players or groups
of players, and the accumulated benefit from these different offers may or may not be worth
the total price paid for it. Lastly, when all players make their offers pursuing their individual
interests only, the total effect may be completely unpredictable, or even detrimental for all
players. It is therefore natural that groups of players get to collaborate in coordinating their
offers. Thus, a coalitional behaviour naturally emerges here, and the preplay negotiation
phase incorporates playing a coalitional game to determine the partition of all players into
coalitions that will coordinate their offers in the negotiation phase. However, we emphasize
again that the transformed normal form game played after the preplay negotiation phase
should remain a non-cooperative game where every player eventually plays for himself.
Inter-play offers in extensive form games. The problem of underperformance is not
limited to normal form games, where players cannot observe the outcome of the opponents’
actions during the play. It also arises in some extensive form games, such as the Centipede
game, where the Backward Induction strategy profile can prescribe to players an utterly
inefficient solution. The idea of preplay offers of payments to other players can be applied
quite effectively in extensive form games by means of inter-play offers, where, before every
move of a player, the other player(s) can make him individual or coalitional offers conditional
on his forthcoming move. The players from both sides can consider these offers through some
commonly accepted solution concept, e.g. Backward Induction, which would provide current
values for each player of every subgame arising after the possible moves of A.
In conclusion, the focal problems of the study initiated here are to:
• analyze the game-theoretic effects of preplay/interplay offers for payments between in-
dividual players and coalitions in strategic and extensive form games, with complete
and incomplete information;
• develop the theory of preplay negotiations and, in particular, the concept of efficient
negotiations under various assumptions considered here;
• analyze the optimality and efficiency of the solutions that can be achieved in preplay
negotiation games;
• expand the study into a systematic theory of cooperation through negotiations in non-
cooperative games.
• apply the developed theory and the obtained results both descriptively and prescrip-
tively to real-life scenarios where our framework applies.
References
[Amb09] Attila Ambrus. Theories of coalitional rationality. Journal of Economic Theory,
144(2):676–695, 2009.
[BN97] Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff. Co-opetition: A Revolutionary Mindset
That Combines Competition and Cooperation. Doubleday, New York, 1997.
[Coa60] Robert Coase. The problem of social cost. J. Law and Economics, 3:1–44, 1960.
[CS11] David Carf`ı and Daniele Schiliro`. A model of coopetitive game and the Greek crisis,
2011. http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.3543.
33
[dGV80] Claude d’Aspremont and Louis-Andre´ Ge´rard-Varet. Stackelberg-solvable games
and pre-play communication. Journal of Economic Theory, 23:201–217, 1980.
[DS91] Leif Danziger and Adi Schnytzer. Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange
mechanism. European Journal of Political Economy, 7:55–64, 1991.
[EP11] Tore Ellingsen and Elena Paltseva. Non-cooperative contracting. Submitted, http:
//www2.hhs.se/personal/ellingsen/pdf/Non-cooperativeContracting5.pdf,
2011.
[Far98] Joseph Farrell. Communication, coordination and nash equilibrium. Economics
Letters, 27:209–214, 1998.
[FJK91] Chaim Fershtman, Kenneth Judd, and Ehud Kalai. Cooperation through delegation.
International Economic Review, 32:551–559, 1991.
[Gor12] Valentin Goranko. Transformations of normal form games by preplay offers for
transfer of utility. Working paper, http://www2.imm.dtu.dk/~vfgo/papers/
submitted/Goranko-GameTransformations_120729.pdf, 2012.
[GT13] Valentin Goranko and Paolo Turrini. An offer you cannot refuse: obtaining efficiency
and fairness in preplay negotiation games with conditional offers. In Huaxin Huang,
Davide Grossi, and Olivier Roy, editors, Proc. of the Fourth International Workshop
on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI’2013), volume 8196 of LNCS, page to
appear. Springer, 2013.
[Gut78] Joel M. Guttman. Understanding collective action: Matching behavior. American
Economic Review, 68(2):251–255, 1978.
[Gut87] Joel M. Guttman. A non-Cournot model of voluntary collective action. Economica,
54(213):1–19, 1987.
[JW05] Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie. Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side
payments among players. Review of Economic Studies, 72(2):543–566, 2005.
[Kal81] Ehud Kalai. Preplay negotiations and the prisoner’s dilemma. Mathematical Social
Sciences, 1:375–379, 1981.
[Mas94] Eric S. Maskin. The invisible hand and externalities. American Economic Review,
84(2):333–337, 1994.
[Mea52] James Meade. External economies and diseconomies in a competitive situation.
Economic Journal, 62(245):54–67, 1952.
[MP89] Steven Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite. Pre-play communication in two- person
sealed-bid double auctions. Journal Of Economic Theory, 48:238–263, 1989.
[MT09] Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz. Strong mediated equilibrium. Artificial
Intelligence, 173(1):180 – 195, 2009.
[Mye97] Roger Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard UP, 1997.
34
[OR90] Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. Bargaining and Markets. Acad. Press, 1990.
[OR94] Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
[Qin02] Cheng-Zhong Qin. Penalties and rewards as inducements to cooperate. Departmen-
tal Working Papers, Dept. of Economics, UC Santa Barbara, 2002.
[Ros75] Robert W. Rosenthal. Induced outcomes in cooperative normal-form games. Review
of Economic Studies, 1975. Discussion Paper No. 178, Center for. Math. Studies,
Northwestern University.
[Rub82] A. Rubinstein. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50:97–110,
1982.
[Sch60] Thomas Schelling. The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, 1960.
[Seg99] Ilya Segal. Contracting with externalities. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(2):337–388, 1999.
[Var94] Hal R. Varian. A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-
informed. American Economic Review, 84(5):1278–93, 1994.
[Wat91] Joel Watson. Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form
games. Economics Letters, 35:267–271, 1991.
[Yam05] Akira Yamada. Alternate contracts for side payments. Economics Bulletin, 3(46):1–
5, 2005.
35
